

I

Introduction

We assure the citizens of Romania of our traditional feelings of friendship and good-neighborliness, and confirm our genuine striving for close cooperation in the interest of socialism and peace.¹

Mikhail Gorbachev, December 1989

These facts cast a bright light on the strange, misplaced and utterly monstrous statements made by some...to the effect that 'good-neighbourly relations' have never ceased to prevail between Romania, Russia and the Ukraine. If we interpret good-neighbourly relations as widely as that, the difference between war and peace does indeed disappear.²

Leon Trotsky, August 1921

[The Romanians are] a people without history...destined to perish before long in the revolutionary world storm. ...[They are] fanatical standard-bearers of counter-revolution and [will] remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great historical revolution. ...[Their] disappearance from the face of the earth [would be] a step forward.³

Fredrich Engels, January 1848

Chapter 1

Stretching the Definition of ‘Friend’

At the height of Romania’s December 1989 revolution Soviet authorities announced their willingness and intent to immediately provide massive “assistance” to their “friendly neighbor” and Warsaw Pact “ally.” Moscow announced that the Soviet Red Cross sent “some 60 mobile teams” of surgeons and medical specialists to the border, many of which had “already crossed” into Romanian territory, and that it was coordinating its efforts with those of other adjacent Pact members.⁴ Communist leaders in Budapest likewise announced that “a working group within the Warsaw Pact which is in permanent contact” would meet in Moscow to discuss the Romanian situation.⁵

These declarations of friendship and benevolent concern stood in stark contrast to one of the most successfully-guarded secrets of Warsaw Pact intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, and one of the most stunning discoveries to emerge from the Soviet Bloc archives since the Cold War. By the time of its revolution Romania had been the target of hostile Soviet and Warsaw Pact disinformation and “active measures” operations for more than two decades.⁶ According to the evidence now available, the Kremlin began treating Romania as hostile territory already by the end of the 1950s, a sentiment partly reflected in Moscow’s decision to cut off all communications between Romanians and their ethnic kin in the Moldavian SSR.

By 1962 Khrushchev ordered the other “closely cooperating” bloc members – the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland – to curtail their intelligence cooperation with Bucharest.⁷ By 1963 that animosity motivated several assassination attempts against Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej.⁸ East Germany’s Ministry of State Security (*Stasi*) had independent reasons for its hostility in that Bucharest refused to acknowledge the permanent division of Germany and concluded a secretly-negotiated accord with West Germany at the end of 1963.⁹

During 1962-1964 the Romanian Department of State Security (DSS or *Securitate*) was excluded from Soviet-assisted intelligence transformations that introduced disinformation departments in the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (and Bulgaria and Poland shortly

thereafter).¹⁰ In 1965 the DSS was again by-passed when KGB Center introduced “regular and direct operational relations” between the disinformation departments, excluding the DSS from bloc-wide “active measures” (propaganda, disinformation and provocation) operations, and from joint operations against the US and its principal NATO partners.¹¹ In mid-1965 Romania was “abruptly” dropped from Warsaw Pact war planning altogether.¹²

KGB archives confirm that by 1967 Moscow was running “active measures” operations to isolate Romania internationally and divide its leadership internally.¹³ Bucharest’s open condemnation of the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and its continuing attempts to aid Prague briefly ended even the pretense of intelligence civility between the official allies. Leonid Brezhnev, János Kádár, Edward Gierek, Todor Zhivkov, and Gustáv Husák repeatedly denounced the Romanian leadership for its “treason” and “betrayal” and no longer defined it as a “fraternal” ally.¹⁴ In the aftermath of the Czechoslovak invasion, on Moscow’s order, the satellite services established permanent “covert residences with legal cover” on Romanian territory, the only Warsaw Pact member to draw such hostile attention.¹⁵ Romania had gone so far beyond the pale that the other Warsaw Pact services categorized it not only with socialist “deviants” Yugoslavia, Albania and China, but alongside NATO adversaries as well.¹⁶

KGB Center and the subordinated East European services now sought intelligence regarding Romania’s international support (primarily from the US, West Germany and China), internal worker and minority dissatisfaction, and opposition within its Communist party, and began aggressively recruiting influential Romanian elites to overthrow the “nationalist” leadership.¹⁷ This clandestine offensive was not confined to the intelligence front. In 1971 Brezhnev and the other Pact leaders deemed it necessary to “now identify those people in Romania on whom we can rely in the future” and recruit them through their “embassies there and other contacts” in order “to exert influence on developments inside the country.”¹⁸ To avoid drawing public attention to Romanian dissidence, the “closely cooperating partners” would “continue to mutually inform ourselves on Romania’s position on all our major issues” and confidentially decide how best to “handle things.” The Soviet leader explained that the respective Central Committee International Department secretaries would meet with their Ideological Department counterparts “to coordinate our common work,” just as they already did “for example, in connection with China and Romania.”¹⁹

Brezhnev was directly referring to the INTERKIT operation

– formally launched in 1967 as the “internal deliberations on China.” INTERKIT coordinated the propaganda, ideological, media, and scientific (academic) resources of all the “closely cooperating” partners plus Mongolia (and later Cuba) through their CC International Departments in order to undermine and discredit Mao’s regime and maintain Beijing’s international isolation.²⁰ Romania was already a target within INTERKIT because, as Bulgarian leader Zhivkov phrased it, “the Chinese rely on Romania and the Romanians support Chinese policies.”²¹ The “closely cooperating” partners had now decided to launch a similar operation dedicated exclusively to the Romanian target.

The overwhelming scale of such an effort had devastating implications for a country whose dimensions, resources and foreign contacts were as limited as those of Romania. In INTERKIT, for instance, the partners coordinated not only “every reference made” to the targeted leadership but also their intelligence-gathering on its divisive international activities, and their operational “activities to roll-back this influence.”²² The “propaganda activities and scientific research of the fraternal parties,” from their “press, radio, TV, press agencies and publishing houses” to their academies of science and state research institutions, were coordinated to reinforce and focus propaganda against the target.²³ This coordination covered a wide array of (dis)informational activities, ranging from “word of mouth propaganda,” articles, and broadcasts to the organization of well-publicized “scholarly” symposiums and an agreed annual “plan for publications and scientific works” to set down their interpretational lines as established truth.

The printed output of this effort was then translated for the appropriate audiences and disseminated “in third countries” through an equally coordinated effort of the partners’ “press, information agencies, and other organs of foreign propaganda,” particularly their foreign ministries and cultural offices.²⁴ Such an operation overwhelmed the collection and analysis capabilities of Western intelligence services and academic communities, both of which were poorly equipped to deal with coordinated disinformation in the first place and unaccustomed to it on such a scale. The logic of intelligence collection and analysis, indeed, of Western scholarly research methodology generally-speaking, meant that scores, even hundreds, of coordinated sources that such an effort could mobilize would inevitably drown out Romania’s singular voice.

Of False Independence and Strategic Insignificance

The necessity of addressing why Romania was so targeted is itself eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of Soviet-coordinated disinformation. By the end of the Cold War increasing consensus held that the Romanian regime was a Soviet “Trojan horse,” noisily proclaiming a hollow independence while others – the Polish and Hungarian leaderships in particular – were quietly engaged in more substantial forms of dissidence.²⁵ Alleging covert agency was one of the two main themes of Soviet disinformation. The other allowed for Romania’s independent defiance but insisted on the country’s strategic insignificance and lack of consequence for Soviet policy and the East-West conflict, except as a factor that unnecessarily perturbed Soviet-American relations. Both of these themes influenced Western perceptions of Romania by the 1980s.

Post-Cold War archival revelations tell a very different story. Romanian opposition to Soviet preferences, it turns out, was greatly underestimated and, with the exception of the Prague Spring, quite singular after 1956 while the ‘dissidence’ of other Pact members was grossly exaggerated when not altogether fabricated.²⁶ In the Warsaw Pact’s Council of Foreign Ministers all other members “habitually concurred with the Soviet analysis and the Soviet proposals” throughout the Cold War, while staunch opposition was the “Romanian exception” affecting “almost all agenda items”²⁷ Likewise, the Romanians stood alone among Pact military leaders in challenging Soviet domination and control while their Polish, Hungarian, East German, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian counterparts continued to rally “unreservedly behind the Soviets.”²⁸

Non-Romanian opposition to Kremlin policy was not merely absent. The “closely cooperating” partners often acted as Soviet proxy in attacking Romania for its dissidence while vying with each other to establish the most “special relationship” with Moscow.²⁹ As a general rule, reported ‘dissidence’ by other Pact members and apparent sympathy for the Romanian position were pre-arranged with Moscow to advance Soviet-loyalist regimes as more worthy partners for the West, and to diminish the unique nature of Romanian opposition. This was often accomplished by misattributing Romanian initiatives to others – again Poland and Hungary especially – as, for example, in blocking the extension of Warsaw Pact membership, and opposing various military interventions planned in Moscow.³⁰

Strategic insignificance continued to be cited by Cold War historians as both cause and effect of an alleged inconsequence to Moscow even after the “Trojan horse” line was exposed as an inversion of the truth.³¹

It is indicative that reports of this insignificance surfaced during periods of heightened Soviet-Romanian antagonism. For example, the 1963 Soviet concept of a strategically-significant “Quartet” in the northern tier of the Pact comprising the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (and thus of Romanian and Bulgarian insignificance) was circulated at the same time that efforts to forcibly replace the Romanian leadership first appeared in the Western media.³² The concept then resurfaced as the “First Strategic Echelon” in mid-1965, when the Romanian Army was suddenly dropped from Warsaw Pact war planning.³³

Certainly, Romania’s planned military contribution to Pact offensive operations lacked significance. Indeed, by 1965 it was non-existent. However, the same can hardly be said regarding its significance for Soviet security. Romania had been designated a principle military threat (along with Poland) by Soviet military and intelligence leaders during most of the interwar period.³⁴ It remained the only land bridge from the USSR to ultra-loyalist Bulgaria and the wider Russophile Balkans: a geographic reality driven home when Romanian refused Soviet troops permission to transit Romania for military exercises in Bulgaria after 1963, and refused Bulgarian forces transit permission in order to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. That Moscow could or would disregard any country accounting for 1,300 km of the western Soviet frontier – the longest border with any European state (and another 200 km of coastline on the Soviet-controlled Black Sea) beggars belief, particularly when the country in question was led by successive regimes antagonistic to the Kremlin’s principal international aims.

Nor could Moscow disregard the several million ethnic Romanians in the bordering Moldavian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics, in territory (Bessarabia and northern Bucovina) formerly belonging to Romania. Approaching the problem much as he had in the annexed Polish territories, Stalin attempted to change the ethnic composition of the region by executing thousands of community leaders and deporting several hundreds of thousands of ethnic Romanians out of the area to Siberia and Central Asia in 1940-1941 and 1950-1951, with continued ‘voluntary’ relocations thereafter.³⁵ That effort, along with longer-term “Russification,” forced assimilation policies, and ‘scholarly’ efforts to deny ethnic kinship, proved less than completely successful, leading Moscow to close down Romanian-Moldavian relations in 1958.³⁶

By the mid-60s Soviet authorities were intensely preoccupied with Romania’s “pernicious” impact on this region as cultural attraction, independent model, and actively subversive influence through its “anti-Soviet” media and publications flowing across the border.³⁷ In 1967 the

Moldavian SSR party boss demanded a propaganda campaign mobilizing “the most qualified scholars” and the “leading officials of the Party, Soviet, and economic organs” to publish in “newspapers, and journals, radio and television broadcasts, books, brochures, and other publications” so that “our children and future generations” would “know well that their fathers did not conceive of a life for themselves outside of Russia” and had always aspired “for union with Russia and for reunion with the Russian state.”³⁸ In 1968 the chief of KGB forces in the USSR’s Western Border District placed Romanian policy towards the region in the same category as the “increased subversive activity by the intelligence services of the USA, the FRG, and England against the USSR.”³⁹ KGB archives reveal that Bucharest’s intentions and activities regarding the region were designated a first priority collection requirement.⁴⁰

This clandestine war continued unabated until the collapse of communism. Reports of the Bulgarian KDS (*Komitet za Drzhavna Sigornost*: Committee for State Security), for example, conspicuously exclude Romania in describing its collaboration “with security organs of fraternal countries.”⁴¹ This absence was all the more noteworthy in that, alongside the KGB and the state security organs of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the KDS also collaborated with the services of Vietnam, Mongolia, Lybia, Benin and Angola on a “fraternal” basis. KGB instructions to its operatives in Romania, intercepted by the DSS in 1982, revealed that “Romania was ‘worked’ as an enemy state, an approach that was not only perpetuated but accentuated after Mikhail Gorbachev came to the leadership.”⁴² The last director of the *Securitate*’s powerful anti-KGB Unit (UM 0110) later testified to a Senate Commission of Inquiry that, when he took command of the unit in 1983 and until its disbandment in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the operational posture of the KGB towards his country was “quite clear.” The KGB considered Romania a target as hostile “as any western country.”⁴³

The Entangling Strategy

It was no simple matter to keep this remarkable state of affairs hidden for so long. In fact, it could not be kept hidden. News of it, however, could be distorted so as to be considered as falling on a scale ranging from excessive paranoia and hysteria, to “conspiracy theorizing,” to purposeful misdirection. A concerted effort by Moscow and its loyalist allies in the Warsaw Pact was required to keep Romania formally within the Soviet Bloc alliance and to downplay the degree and significance of its opposition to Soviet actions and aims. This “entangling strategy “

mirrored that which Khrushchev adopted towards Belgrade in the 1950s, publicly treating the country as friend and ally “to avoid strengthening Yugoslav ties with the West and alienating neutralist opinion” even while simultaneously pursuing extensive clandestine operations to achieve the “isolation of Tito.”⁴⁴

Drawing Romania back into the fold became a core aim of Pact intelligence operations in the region under Khrushchev and his successors. As the Soviet leader explained to his Czechoslovak counterpart in August 1964, it was “the responsibility of the Party to stop Rumania leaving the Pact” and to re-unite it “with our Socialist family.”⁴⁵ A decade later East German state security described “the agreed foreign policy of the Warsaw Treaty states vis-à-vis Romania” as pressing “for closer practical involvement of Romania in the common multilateral political and economic activities” in order to create “elements tying Romania to the socialist community” and “objectively narrow” it “room for maneuver.”⁴⁶

Brezhnev also insisted that the “closely cooperating” partners “must keep trying to influence Romania” towards this end.⁴⁷ This policy remained constant through the brief tenure of Andropov, the even briefer Chernenko interlude, and under the leadership of Andropov protégé Mikhail Gorbachev. As the *Stasi* noted in the mid-1980s, Moscow’s loyalist allies “sought and continue to seek to draw Romania into” their security policies, and the “political-operational work” of their combined state security organs continued to employ “all the possibilities of the member states of the socialist community to act on the Romanian Socialist Republic with the aim of maintaining and intensifying existing ties between Romania and the Warsaw Treaty and the CMEA, as well as bilateral contacts.”⁴⁸

The entangling strategy was ultimately so successful in fostering public doubts in the West regarding the sincerity of the Romanian regime’s dissidence that, during the 1980s, even head-on Soviet-Romanian clashes went unrecorded by Western intelligence services. However, according to Pact state security organs, the strategy failed completely in its aim of modifying Romanian behavior in the desired manner. Romanian policy “clearly” persisted in contravening “the fundamental foreign policy interests of the Socialist Community of States,” opposing them “regarding almost all of the important questions of international development (disarmament, process of détente, conflict in the Middle East) as well as collaboration within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and CMEA.” Moreover, Bucharest engaged in “public confrontations” with the positions adopted by the community ever “more intensely” and had, “for all practical purposes, aligned itself with western policies.” The

Stasi concluded that the rest of the Warsaw Pact could anticipate “the predictable accentuation of the special positions adopted by Romania.”⁴⁹ In other words, Romania opposed Pact foreign and security policy, refused subordination with the alliance, adopted and defended policies that were suspiciously similar to those of the West, and gave every sign of continuing to do so in the future.

As part of its effort to reel Romania back into Soviet security arrangements, and especially to obscure the degree of its dissident opposition, the Pact downplayed or denied Soviet-Romanian differences altogether. After 1968 Moscow rarely clashed frontally with Bucharest at meetings of the Warsaw Pact, CMEA, or other international socialist gatherings, instead designating proxies – usually Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria or a developing state – for that purpose. Likewise, Moscow preferred to use Hungary as its mouthpiece in post-meeting media attacks. The Pact even excised mention of such differences from its reports and meeting transcripts, even when they amounted to what Bloc foreign ministries considered a direct “confrontation with the foreign policy line of the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty nations.”⁵⁰

Soviet records, for example, did not record Bucharest’s veto of the use of the CMEA for funneling assistance to Soviet Arab clients during and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, just as they neglected to note its repeated criticisms of the “closely cooperating” partners’ invasion of Czechoslovakia during meetings of the socialist community. When, for example, the Romanians rejected Polish preparations for the extension of the Warsaw Pact in the spring of 1984, “no mention of the debate was included in the minutes” of their meetings – a rather astonishing omission of an objection to the continuity of the Pact itself.⁵¹ Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to Gorbachev appealed to Romanian leaders to keep their differences quiet, ‘within the family,’ and characterized their international policy stances and periodic declarations on intra-Bloc politics as irrational.⁵² Indeed, the most powerful element of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy against Romania during the 1980s was a campaign of denigration and what amounted to national character assassination which, in terms of its aims and achievements, can best be compared with the “Black Legend” used to isolate Spain from the rest of medieval Europe.

Operations against the Romanian target were treated as extremely sensitive and carried out with an extraordinary degree of secrecy, often requiring approval from the heads of their state security organs and KGB Center.⁵³ How carefully the Kremlin and its “closely cooperating” partners tread regarding their anti-Romanian operations can be judged by the fact that, although they were undertaken for more than twenty

years and involved the services of at least six countries, no “smoking gun” surfaced until the reconstruction of partial databases from files of the defunct East German service that were returned to Germany from the United States at the beginning of the new millennium.⁵⁴

Moscow’s extraordinary emphasis on maintaining this cover is reflected in the 1983 order to expand Pact operations against Romania.⁵⁵ Significantly, in the GDR the order was given directly by *Stasi* boss Ernst Mielke to the head of the ZAIG (*Zentrale Aufwertungs und Informationsgruppe*), the 1,000-strong analytical body that provided the “powers of reason” for East German intelligence.⁵⁶ The ZAIG chief stipulated to the HVA that only “absolutely trustworthy sources” under “especially severe requirements regarding their conspiratorial character and the preservation of secrecy” be employed.⁵⁷ “In no case,” he underscored, “must it be observed that the Ministry of State Security has taken specific measures” against the Romanian target, and “the sources must not undertake any sort of intelligence collection activity which could permit other persons or organs to discover or recognize the goals which we are proposing to them.”

This deception was deemed necessary not only, or even primarily, to avoid tactical countermeasures. Discovery of a coordinated Soviet Bloc intelligence operation against Pact member Romania would reveal a far greater importance attached to the country than Moscow’s disinformation campaigns publicly avowed, and indicate the true degree of Pact-Romanian hostilities that theretofore had been so effectively masked. Such a revelation would have exploded the “Trojan horse” and “covert dependence” legends, probably pushed Romania further towards the West, and possibly encouraged more Western engagement with it at a time when successful “active measures” were prompting Western capitals to pull away. This had been precisely the sequence of events following the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, resulting in closer US-Yugoslav relations and massive Western military, economic and political assistance to Belgrade. It was therefore imperative to avoid any explicit break that might earn Romania similar Western assistance and guarantee its independence.⁵⁸

Ironically, Moscow had greater success reeling non-Warsaw Pact member Belgrade, the “sacred cow” of anti-Soviet defiance among British and American political leaders and intelligence analysts, back under its influence. By the mid-1960s Yugoslavia engaged in much closer military and intelligence cooperation with the USSR than Moscow’s own Romanian ally. In 1962, a year after Bucharest had ended the practice, Belgrade began sending its officers to Soviet military academies for training (even forbidding its combat pilots from learning “English for

fear they would defect with their MiGs.”⁵⁹ In 1967 and 1973, when Romania denied military facilities and closed its airspace to Soviet and Pact aircraft during Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East, Tito placed Yugoslav facilities at Soviet disposition, even playing host to a regiment of the Soviet 106th Air Assault Division “in anticipation of deployment to Syria.”⁶⁰

This Yugoslav drift, persistently interpreted by the US intelligence community as not indicating a turn towards Moscow, prompted the reorganization of the Romanian anti-KGB unit into four directorates by the early 1980s. Two directorates dealt with KGB and GRU operations exclusively. One was devoted to combating Hungarian and Yugoslav operations, albeit with the bulk of personnel and resources dedicated to the Hungarian services. The remaining directorate was responsible for all other socialist services, from East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia to those of Soviet client states in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Covert Relationships and Missing Archives

Another reason why knowledge of the hostile relationship between the rest of the Warsaw Pact and Romania remained so limited was tied to the covert nature of the “special relationships” that Bucharest established with Washington, Beijing and Bonn. In fighting its battle “along interior lines” against superior and encircling forces, from the 1950s into the 1980s the Romanians generally sought to avoid the public spotlight and the increased Soviet pressure that inevitably accompanied it. Bucharest had set the ground rules with its US counterparts in 1964, cautioning Washington:

... not to make “too much noise” for that “could affect certain people.” It is desirable not to exaggerate events in Rumania. In particular, the less publicity about Rumanian independence at this juncture, the better. Overattention to this in foreign press could harm rather than help our future relations. For the moment, Rumania would like to be placed after Yugoslavia and Poland among the Eastern European countries, in the public eye. “Our aspirations for independence can best be achieved not by noisy and insistent publicity but by a quiet and constructive development in Rumania’s relations with the US and the West.”⁶¹

Thus, except for the press ‘leaks’ designed to scuttle Romanian efforts, little on its mediation efforts during the US-Vietnam war, and virtually nothing regarding its mediation of Chinese relations with Italy,

Austria, West German and Sweden during the second half of the 1960s, ever came to public attention during the Cold War.⁶² At the end of the 1970s changes within the Romanian leadership led to a catastrophic loss of strategic direction in its campaign to undermine Soviet control and influence in the region. As a result, Bucharest's special relationships in the West progressively succumbed to the active measures campaign that Moscow had prosecuted for almost two decades at that point. The agents of that campaign included all of the other Bloc members, as well as de facto Bloc members (such as, at various times, Mongolia, Cuba and North Korea, for example) and a host of other Soviet and Pact agents ranging from Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, to senior Soviet and East European analysts for West German intelligence Gabrielle Gast, to senior Japanese and South Korean political elites. The combination of self-induced secrecy and external active measures joined with the increasing irrationality of the domestic regime to obscure actual Romanian behavior and lend plausibility to even the most extravagant of accusations.

A third reason why this veil proved so resistant was Moscow's ability to winnow the security archives of all its loyalist regimes. The transition governments of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria concluded formal agreements with Moscow permitting the KGB access to their foreign intelligence files during 1989-1991, with a preemptory "right to remove any material relating to Soviet security."⁶³ KGB personnel even worked in parallel with citizens' groups during 1990 sorting through the Czechoslovak and East German foreign intelligence archives. Meanwhile, the services themselves were engaged in wholesale destruction of their records (operational files especially).

This effort ultimately failed in the case of East Germany because of the speed with which the Party-state edifice crumbled. In the midst of this collapse, US intelligence launched operations to recover the rapidly vanishing *Stasi* foreign intelligence, and managed to acquire the *Rozenholz* (Rosewood) files before they could be destroyed, carted off to Moscow or dispersed by mobs storming *Stasi* facilities. The reconstructed and decrypted databases of this archive most clearly outlined the hostile Warsaw Pact-Romanian intelligence relationship.⁶⁴ Along with the surviving East German records of the INTERKIT operation, they provided a road-map that made sense of other incidental information on Romania-related KGB operations supplied by former Soviet intelligence officers, and further confirmed in the (heavily-censored) reports of other Pact intelligence services.⁶⁵

Paradoxically, despite unabated opposition to Soviet dominance even after Romania had lost its strategic moorings, Moscow's agents

within the country were able to capitalize on Ceaușescu's unpopularity to discredit all independent Romanian foreign and security policies and temporarily exert control over its security institutions and affairs during and immediately after the 1989 revolution. Ironically, even as those Brezhnev-era agents briefly achieved power Gorbachev's Kremlin was pursuing a different agenda.

Illustrative of the problems facing interpretation of Romania's role in the Cold War, in the midst of the revolution self-admitted Soviet agent Silviu Brucan was able to successfully advocate the appointment of previously exposed Soviet agents to key national security posts during and after the revolution, including Nicolae Militaru as defense minister (26 December 1989-14 February 1990) and Mihai Caraman as director of foreign intelligence (13 January 1990-23 April 1992).⁶⁶ Clarity was hardly likely to be forthcoming from someone who, in September 1990, stated to former Soviet Central Committee International Department chief Vadim Zagladin that for him the struggle against American imperialism was "more important than the principles of international law, then respecting UN resolutions."⁶⁷

Negotiating Revolution, Ensuring Continuities

Finally, unlike Romania's revolution, which entailed the disintegration of political institutions, the nullification of the constitution, and an abrupt and unmediated change of power, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria negotiated their regime changes and maintained their existing institutions. The resulting continuity of their state administrative bodies and the virtual continuity of the personnel staffing them stifled the possibility of inconvenient truths arising from those quarters, particularly under conditions of post-Communist peer competition. This continuity was most noteworthy in their intelligence and security services.

Ironically, although Romania was the only country to immediately dissolve its intelligence apparatus, cutting loose entire departments and more than 60% of its personnel, while the other countries ensured a remarkable stability of institutional arrangements and cadres, it was singled out as a laggard in intelligence reform.⁶⁸ Even Czechoslovakia opted for downsized continuity until the end of 1990 when, with exceptional British, U.S. and German assistance, it instituted a reform that still left the personnel and structures of its military intelligence services virtually untouched and many of its foreign intelligence personnel in place.⁶⁹ Continuity was far greater in Poland and Hungary,

where roundtable discussions that so brilliantly accomplished their goal of peaceful transition from single- to multi-party rule while ensuring the continued peaceful administration of their countries also “grandfathered-in” all but a very small part of the GRU and KGB-trained intelligence and military leadership.⁷⁰

The Polish government’s Macierewicz Report, released in February 2007, detailed how its military intelligence officers continued to be trained in GRU and KGB facilities not only during 1989-1991 – the final years of the Soviet Union – but also during 1992-1993, by their little-reformed Russian successor services. Appointments and promotions continued to be made from the “perspective cadre” approved and trained by Moscow, including three military intelligence chiefs and four deputy chiefs, well into the new millenium.⁷¹ Over three hundred Soviet/Russian trainees served in Polish military intelligence (WSI) during 1991-2006, with several dozen graduates serving in the “upper echelon” of WSI structures as late as 2006.⁷²

The stability of GRU and KGB-trained cadres in the Hungarian services was at least as strong. An international scandal ensued when Hungary assumed chairmanship of NATO’s counterespionage committee in 2008 because the head of the Hungarian counter-intelligence service – the National Security Office (NBH) – spent six and half years at the KGB’s Dzerzhinsky Academy in the Soviet Union.⁷³ Concurrently, the director general of Hungary’s military counterintelligence (Military Security Office: KBH) and the officers in charge of classification in both the KBH and the foreign intelligence service (Information Office: IH) were also KGB or GRU alumni.⁷⁴

Some observers saw these connections as an asset. After all, such training presumably conferred greater knowledge of the Russian services, their methods and their operations. However, as the Macierewicz Report noted, the principal goal of KGB and GRU trainers was to identify the personal addictions and weaknesses of the students and the institutional vulnerabilities of their home services, suggesting quite the opposite instrumentality. In the case of Bulgaria at least, the network of clandestine cooperation operating for “over forty-five years” meant that senior “military, security and diplomatic” personnel “kept the habit and practice of coordinating their attitudes and actions” with the Kremlin.⁷⁵ It is therefore more probable that Moscow continued to exert influence over the secrecy of past operations and the conduct of current intelligence policy in the Polish and Hungarian cases as well, making it unlikely that the leadership of their services would rush to expose something Moscow preferred to keep hidden.⁷⁶

Issues Preceding Communism, Succeeded Communism

Aside from continuity of structures, personnel, and attitudes among the “closely cooperating” partners, there were also more specific common interests that endured after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In stark contrast to the Polish-Russian relationship, where issues of borders, national identity and political options were largely resolved by the end of the Cold War, the issues that had fed Soviet and Hungarian hostility towards Romania during the 1950s-1980s were still outstanding well into the new millennium. Consequently, even though the Bessarabian/Moldovan and Transylvanian problems had been priority targets for Soviet and Hungarian intelligence attention ever since the First World War, very little information regarding those operations came to light after 1989.⁷⁷ Hungary’s post-1989 national security law, for instance, stipulated classification terms for intelligence operations up to 90 years, rendering the probability of revelations regarding its relations with Romania during the Communist period unlikely in the near or medium-term, barring legislative changes.⁷⁸

Indeed, traditional cooperation patterns were more broadly reinforced by similarities between the perspectives of Hungarian and Soviet/Russian authorities regarding their diaspora in neighboring states (the “near abroad”) during and after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Hungary thus became the first state with which Russia concluded a bilateral state treaty, prepared in advance at the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow, in December 1991.⁷⁹ Moscow and Budapest then re-established the formal linkage of their ethnic-territorial disputes with Romania by signing a joint declaration of cooperation for *Assuring the Rights of National, Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities* in November 1992, an agreement publicly touted at the time by both sides as a “watershed” in Russo-Hungarian relations (and later viewed with embarrassment by authorities in Budapest).⁸⁰

The Post-Communist leaders in Hungary championed territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Transylvania with an insistence reminiscent of the decades-long revisionist campaign launched by Budapest at the end of World War I.⁸¹ Indeed, the two men who in 1987 introduced the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which became Hungary’s first post-Communist ruling party, Sándor Csóori and István Czurka, were both known for their separatist and right-radical agenda.⁸² After 1989 Csóori became Chairman of the Hungarian World Federation, an organization first established in 1927 to press territorial claims against Romania (and against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). Fortunately, Communist-era

allegations of gross minority rights abuses, forced assimilation, and “genocide” that seemed plausible in the context of Romania’s isolation during the Cold War quickly gave way to first hand observation by European institutions.⁸³

Transparency regarding similar aspects of their relationship with Romania was equally absent in the Soviet/Russian case. At the beginning of 1990 the Kremlin was intensely concerned with the attraction that a stable, western-oriented Romania might exert on the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. In an effort to counter that pull during the Cold War the USSR had propagated an image of Romania “as a negative and primitive influence alien to Moldovan identity,” and the majority population of the Moldavian SSR as requiring Soviet protection “against ‘Romanian assimilationism.’”⁸⁴ Russia continued its policy of fostering animosity in Chişinău and Kyiv against Bucharest by portraying the latter as pursuing territorial “ambitions toward Moldova and parts of the Ukraine that it lost to the USSR after World War II,” while depicting Moscow as “the defender of the territorial integrity of Romania’s northern neighbors”⁸⁵

The Kremlin had reason to fear the “Romanian threat” to its control over the Moldavian SSR. Not, of course, because Bucharest could force the issue, but rather because of the powerful draw that a consolidated and prosperous Romania would have on its ethnic kin across the border. At the beginning of 1990 the CIA judged that “separatist pressures” in the Moldavian SSR would “continue to grow.” Moreover, it noted that:

Nationalist sentiment in Moldavia has been strengthened by recent events in Romania. It is likely to grow if Romania’s new regime can stabilize that country and begin to forge a viable democratic political system.⁸⁶

The CIA came to the same conclusion seven months later, after the Moldavians signed their first European treaty of mutual cooperation with Romania:

As ethnic Romanians, the Moldavians are looking to Bucharest for assistance in resurrecting their long-suppressed national identity. They also hope to lay a foundation for eventual reunification with Romania.⁸⁷

Eight months later, the US intelligence community was in agreement that while Moldova would continue to seek independence, “a shift in Romania toward greater authoritarianism would probably make the Moldovans more willing to stay in the [Soviet] union.”⁸⁸

Hypothetically then, Soviet Moldova could be retained, and a Moldovan-Romanian rapprochement blocked, by preventing the consolidation of administrative authority and reform progress in Romania, and by encouraging turmoil, divisiveness and authoritarian reaction. There is a significant probability that the KGB reached conclusions akin to those of the CIA, thus identifying a Soviet security interest in Romania's continued instability.⁸⁹ It is suggestive that more than 25,000 of the 37,000 "extra" Soviet tourists that deemed Romania a desirable place to visit or transit in the two weeks prior to its revolution in December 1989 chose not to leave until almost a year later, in October 1990, after the Romanian government formally insisted on their departure.⁹⁰

Russian focus on the Romanian-Moldovan relationship became much more intense in 1993, when NATO officially opened its doors to new members and the US initiated the first military assistance programs for Romania. A stable, prosperous and secure Romania within the Western alliance would exert an enormous draw for the Republic of Moldova, and possibly for Ukraine as well. Evghenii Primakov, appointed KGB deputy chairman and head of the First Directorate – quickly recast by him as the *Sluzba Vneshnei Razvedki* (Foreign Intelligence Service) at the beginning of October 1991 – led the campaign against NATO enlargement, insisting that Romania would make a "grab" for Moldova if admitted into the North Atlantic alliance.⁹¹

Primakov employed a variety of disinformation techniques against Romania to discredit its past and present worthiness as Western partner. For example, by claiming "Ceaușescu demanded that Soviet troops be sent to Romania" to support him during the 1989 revolution Primakov apparently sought to discredit the degree of his independence from, suspicion of, and antagonism towards Moscow.⁹² In fact, the Romanian leader vigorously threatened countermeasures if the Soviet or Pact military forces should cross his country's frontier and protested the thinly disguised military personnel crossing the border in automobile caravans masquerading as "tourists."⁹³

The post-Communist Kremlin also attempted to capitalize on Bucharest's "failure" to conclude treaties with all of its former neighbors as leverage against Romania's alliance bid – the existence of good relations with neighboring states being a prerequisite for NATO membership. In order to keep Chișinău and Bucharest apart, Moscow labeled even the most disinterested Romanian assistance as pernicious interference in Moldovan domestic affairs while it conspicuously aided the breakaway region of Transnistria and exerted an unconstructive monopoly over the adjudication of the Moldovan-Transnistria conflict and its aftermath. In

this respect, the fact that Primakov was given responsibility for managing the Moldovan-Transnistrian “frozen” conflict after his tenures at the SVR and Russian foreign ministry was suggestive.

Emblematic of legacy Soviet strategy, Moscow conditioned any treaty with Bucharest on the inclusion of a clause precluding NATO membership, a condition that it did not insist on (for very long) in its treaties with Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia.⁹⁴ Consequently, Romania was the only former member of the Warsaw Pact with which Russia refused to conclude such a treaty throughout the 1990s.⁹⁵ Moscow agree to a treaty only in July 2003, some eight months after NATO had already formally offered admission to Romania and more than a decade since Russia concluded similar treaties with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

Russian insistence in 2008-2009 that the US had reneged on alleged understandings by placing military bases in Romania, and its continued involvement in Moldovan issues in a manner that consistently discouraged closer relations with Romania, indicated the persistence of strategic obsessions very similar to those that motivated prior Soviet hostility towards Romania. Consequently, there appears to be little possibility of institutional interests driving greater clarity on Moscow’s Cold War relations with and operations against Romania in the near future.

This study examines the genesis of Romania’s transformation from ally to enemy within the Soviet bloc, its efforts to disencumber itself of Soviet control, and Soviet and Warsaw Pact countermeasures to both ensnare and discredit the regime and its independent policies during the Cold War. After addressing the competing strategic interests and embedded antagonisms with its Hungarian and Russian neighbors before Communism, the study follows the generation of Soviet and Warsaw Pact hostility, and the policies pursued by the USSR and its loyalist partners within the Warsaw Pact to curb and roll-back Romania’s independent foreign and security policies. It seeks to delve beyond the propaganda and disinformation regarding intra-Pact relations by examining internal Warsaw Pact proceedings, intelligence service reports and national Party documents that have become available since the collapse of the USSR. In so doing, it sets in relief the impact of Soviet-coordinated disinformation and active measures on Western, especially US, perceptions by correlating events, debates and clashes within the Warsaw Pact as recorded within its innermost councils, with the concurrent assessments generated by the intelligence and academic communities in the United States.

Endnotes

1. “Gorbachev Briefs Congress on Romanian Events,” *Moscow Television Service*, 22 December 1989, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-SOV-89-246*, 26 December 1989, p. 32
2. Speech to the Moscow Soviet, 30 August 1921 in *The Military Writings Of Leon Trotsky*, Volume 4, *1921-1923 Banditry and Famine*, www.marxist.org.
3. Friedrich Engels, “The Magyar Struggle,” *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, no. 194, 13 January 1849 in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 8, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 229. The Romanians shared this distinction with the south Slav peoples.
4. *TASS* in English, Radio Moscow International Service, and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 23-25 December 1989. FBIS-SOV-89-246, 26 December 1989, pp. 1, 13, 17-18, 21. Moscow also claimed to have assembled a 6,000-bed hospital in Moldova for Romanian wounded.
5. “Pact Foreign Ministers Likely to Meet,” *Agence France Press* in English, 23 December 1989, FBIS-SOV-89-246, 26 December 1989, p. 13.
6. Georg Herbstritt, “Eine feindliches Bruderland: Rumänien im Blick der DDR-Staatssicherheit” [An Enemy Fraternal Country: Romania As Perceived By GDR-State Security], *Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik* (Berlin), no. 1 (May 2004).
7. Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You*, London, Sedgwick and Jackson, 1982, pp. 66-7 and 76; Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972, p. 146
8. *Intelligence Report on Attempt on Life of Georgiu Dej and Soviet-Romanian Relations*, 1965, British National Archives, FO 371/182729, Foreign Office, Political Departments: General Correspondence for 1906-1966, Northern, Romania (NR). Having no assets in Romania during 1958-1962, some CIA analysts believed the 1963 attempt provoked Bucharest’s independent course. See e.g., *Instability and Change in Soviet-Dominated Eastern Europe: An Intelligence Assessment (EUR 82-10124)*, 1 December 1982 (declassified 29 January 2001), pp. 8 and 19, www.foia.cia.gov (hereafter: CIA).
9. Georg Herbstritt and Stejaru Olaru, *Stasi si securitate* [*Stasi And Securitate*], Bucharest, Humanitas, 2005, pp. 80-1. The reports are from the *Stasi*’s Main Reconnaissance Administration (*Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* or HVA) responsible for foreign intelligence
10. Sejna (1982), p. 66; Bittman (1972), pp. 17, 89-90 and 144. The DSS was periodically reorganized as a Council instead of Department and known as the CSS. DSS is used throughout this study to refer to both.
11. Bittman (1972), pp. 144 and 157-8, Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny, eds., *China and Eastern Europe, 1960-1980s*, Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese-East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24-26 March 2004, pp. 108-9, in “Global Cold War,” *Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security* (formerly: *Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact*), www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network (hereafter: PHP).
12. Before 1965 the “Hungarian 5th army was expected to work in close cooperation with the Romanian 3rd army in all military manoeuvres and operational plans.” Imre Okvath, “Hungary in the Warsaw Pact: The Initial Phase of Integration, 1957 – 1971,” in Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, editors, “European Cities Targeted for Nuclear Destruction: Hungarian Documents on the Soviet Bloc War

Plans, 1956-71,” 29 November 2001 (hereafter Okv ath (2001)), “Warsaw Pact War Plans,” PHP.

13. Christopher Andrews and Vitalyi Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, New York, Basic Books, 2005, p. 290.

14. *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea*, 2 August 1971, pp. 21-24, in “General Documentation,” Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher, editors, “China and Eastern Europe from the 1960s to the 1980s,” 1 December 2004, PHP.

15. Herbstritt (2004), pp. 1-2; William Totok, “Romania, o zona operativa a securitatii Stasi. Interviu cu cercetatorul german Georg Herbstritt” [Romania, An Operational Zone of Stasi State Security. Interview with German Researcher Georg Herbstritt], *Observator Cultural* (Bucharest), no. 227 (29 June – 5 July 2004), www.observatorcultural.ro. The “closely cooperating partner” services had operated covertly in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and would do so again in Poland during 1980-1981. However, they operated in official liaison with the local services, and their covert residences were shut down afterwards.

16. *Komitet Dzhurna Sigornosti [Committee for State Security] (KDS) Plan for Operational Measures Toward Yugoslav, Romanian and Czechoslovak Military Attach es*, 06/12/1969, Archives of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (AMVR), Sofia, fond 2, record 3, file 356; and *No Title*, 10/07/1982, AMVR, Sofia, Fond 1, Record 12, File 434, “Bulgaria in the Cold War,” *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)*, www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (Hereafter: CWIHP)

17. See e.g. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive And The Secret History Of The KGB*, New York, Basic Books, 2001, p. 270.

18. *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea*, 2 August 1971, pp. 21-24, Nuenlist and Locher (2004), PHP.

19. Op. cit., pp. 40-43.

20. *First INTERKIT Meeting, Moscow, Soviet Union*, 14 December 1967, p. 1, in “Reports on Interkit Meetings on the China Situation and Related Documents,” Nuenlist and Locher (2004) (hereafter: INTERKIT), PHP.

21. *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea*, 2 August 1971, pp. 21, 23-24, “General Documentation,” INTERKIT, PHP.

22. *Second INTERKIT Meeting, East Berlin, East Germany*, 20-31 January 1969, p. 3, INTERKIT, PHP.

23. Op. cit., p. 4-7. This included propaganda through “OIRT and Interviision,” which included Finland.

24. In addition, their foreign correspondents systematically cooperated “with respect to the collection and exchange of information” whether or not they were intelligence officers under journalist cover.

25. Vlad Socor re-launched this theme in “The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered,” *Orbis*, vol. 20, no. 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 701-32. It was taken up again by KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn, *New Lies for Old: An Ex-KGB Officer Warns How Communist Deception Threatens survival of the West*, New York, Dodd, Mead & Co, 1984, by David B. Funderburk, *Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981-1985*, Washington DC, Selous Foundation Press, 1987, and by Securitate defector Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons*, Washington DC, Regnery Gateway, 1987.

26. Pact archives reveal real differences between the non-Soviet allies and Moscow. That said, only the Romanian Communist leadership constituted genuine opposition, refusing to back down even when Moscow insisted. For intra-Pact differences see e.g. Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma, editors, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intra-bloc Conflicts*, Kent, Kent State University Press, 2008.

27. Anna Locher, "Shaping the Policies of the Alliance: The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact, 1976-1990" May 2002, p. 18, in "Records of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs," PHP.

28. Christian Nünlist, "Cold War Generals: The Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, 1969-90," (2001), p. 8; Jordan Baev, "The End of the Warsaw Pact, 1985-1991: Viewed from the Bulgarian Archives," p. 6, in Jordan Baev and Ana Locher, "The Irresistible Collapse of the Warsaw Pact: Documents from Bulgarian Archives, 1985-1991," November 2000, PHP.

29. Vojtech Mastny, *Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact?*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung no. 58, Zurich, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich, 2001, pp. 23 and 28, available at PHP; Csaba Békés, "Introduction," Records of the Meetings of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers, PHP, September 2005, pp. 2-3; Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher, "At The Roots Of The European Security System: Thirty Years Since The Helsinki Final Act," Conference Report, Center For Security Studies, ETH Zurich, November 2005, p. 4 at PHP. See also Csaba Békés, "Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Soviet Alliance System, 1968-1989," *Foreign Policy Review* (Budapest), vol. 3, no. 1 (2004), pp. 87- 127.

30. See former East German Military Attaché Col. Joachim Schroter in Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny (eds.), *China and Eastern Europe, 1960s-1980s*, Beijing, 24-26 March 2004, Zurich, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich, November 2004, p. 140. The Liu-Mastny report is available at "Publications," PHP. In an earlier work Mastny misattributed the primary credit for this to Poland (which indeed had misgivings). Mastny (2001), p. 15.

31. Mastny (2001), p. 44; Lochner (2002), p. 14; Nünlist (2001), p. 8. Despite clear archival evidence to the contrary, the Trojan horse theme continued to be sounded by otherwise serious scholars well into the new millennium. See e.g., Charles King, "Remembering Romanian Communism," *Slavic Review*, vol. 66, no. 4 (Winter 2007), pp. 719-720.

32. *Intelligence Report on attempt on life of Georgiu Dej [sic.] and Soviet-Romanian relations* (1965); Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday and Company, 1969, pp. 305-306.

33. *Intelligence Study: Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking* (Ref Title: Caesar XXVI), 7 June 1965 (declassified 27 March 2007), p. 27, CIA; Okváth (2001), PHP.

34. Raymond W. Leonard, *Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918-1933*, Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1999, pp. 15-16, 46, 74, 168-172, 181; David J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 14, 25, 305, 393. Romania remained a strategic priority during World War II, although Soviet authorities did their best to conceal their preoccupation with it. David M. Glantz, *Red Storm Over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944*, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2007, pp. xiii-xiv, 14-22, 371-375.

35. Dennis Deletant estimates between 100,000 and 500,000 were deported in I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, editors, *The Oxford Companion to World War II*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 129.

36. Fritz Ermarth, "Bodyul Again Attacks Anti-Russian Feeling in Moldavia," 17 March 1967a, Radio Free Europe Research (RFER), OSA, Box 110, Folder 2, File 163 and "Socialist Encirclement is Also Dangerous," 29 July 1968, USSR/5, RFER, Box 50, Folder 7, Report 142, Open Society Archives (OSA). Thenceforth, the Moldavian SSR's "more frequent" contacts of "greater prominence" with Budapest and Sofia superseded those with Romanian. Chişinău even had closer ties with Mongolia and the developing world. Ermarth (1967a), p. 5. By 1968 Moscow's relations with capitalist Finland, Iran, Afghanistan and even NATO member Turkey were "certainly better" than those with Romania. Ermarth (1967a), p. 1.

37. Mark Kramer, "Moldova, Romania, and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin*, No. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 326; Mark Kramer, "Ukraine And The Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis Of 1968 (Part 2): New Evidence From The Ukrainian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 14/15 (Winter 2003/Spring 2004), pp. 295-301; *Report for the First Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party on actions taken to prevent the circulation of Romanian Press in Moldavia*, 10/04/1968, *Arhiva Organizatiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova*, Fond 51, Inventar 29, Dosar 49, Foaie 41-42, CWIHP.

38. *Sovietskaia Moldavia*, 16 February 1967; Ermarth (1967a).

39. Kramer (2003/2004), p. 298 and 349, footnote 172; Memorandum No. 2039-A (Top Secret) from Yu. V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 30 August 1968, in *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii* (RGANI), F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll 58-6; *On the Position of Romania in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia*, Report No. MB-4809/65 (Top Secret), from V. Makashev, deputy secretary-general of the Soviet foreign ministry, 16 October 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 188-194; and *On Romanian Attitudes Towards the Developments in Czechoslovakia (Political Writing)*, Cable No. 1000 (Top Secret), A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and the CPSU Secretariat, 23 September 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 130-154.

40. Andrew and Mitrokhin (2001), p. 270.

41. *Information re: KDS collaboration with the "fraternal" security services in 1978*, 15 May 1979, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior Archives (AMVR), Sofia, fond 1, record 10a, file 344, in "Bulgaria in the Cold War," CWIHP. The KDS was periodically labeled Department and Directorate as well as Committee, and abbreviated as the DS. KDS is used throughout in order to distinguish it from Romania's DSS.

42. Serviciul Român de Informații (SRI), *Punct de vedere preliminară al Serviciul Român de Informații privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989* [Preliminary Point of View of the Romanian Intelligence Service Regarding the Events of December 1989], Bucharest, Arhiva Senatului României, 1990, p. 27. See also Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *Istoria loviturilor de stat în România: "Revoluția din decembrie 1989" – o tragedie românească* [History of Coup d'états in Romania: "The Revolution of December 1989" – A Romanian Tragedy], vol. 4, part I, Bucharest, RAO, 2004, p. 99.

43. *Stenograma nr. 33, 26 ianuarie 1994, audierea generalului-locotenent Neculicioiu Victor* [Transcript No. 33, 26 January 1994, Hearing of Lieutenant General Victor Neculicioiu], Bucharest, Arhiva Senatului Roman, p. 5. Western services aware of Romanian-Pact antagonisms were much less aware of the degree of their mutual hostility. Author's conversations with MI6 and CIA officers, 28 October 2006, Ottawa, and 26 November 2007, New Orleans.

44. *Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure (NIE 12-57)*, 19 February 1957 (declassified 22 September 1993), p. 8, CIA. This was a far more focused strategy than the entangling methods Moscow generally employed to co-opt or suborn East European (and other) elites.

45. Sejna (1982), p. 76.
46. *Relations of Romania SR to China and their position to the current policies of the Chinese leadership*, Political Section, Embassy in Bucharest, 18 December 1972, INTERKIT, PHP.
47. *Minutes of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov – Leonid I. Brezhnev, Voden Residence [Bulgaria]*, 09/20/1973, CSA [Bulgarian State Archives (*Tsentralen Drzhaven Arhiv*)], Sofia, Fond 378-B, File 360, “Bulgaria in the Cold War,” CWIHP.
48. *Informative Note Drawn Up By The Chief of Service Referring to The Current Situation of Romania and The Policy of That State*, HVA, Abteilung VII, 15 December 1983, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 6267, S. 10-12; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), pp. 361-2.
49. Op. cit., pp. 361-2 and 367.
50. Vojtech Mastny, “Editorial Note XVII. Meeting of the PCC, Warsaw, 14-15 May 1980,” in Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Douglas Selvage, editors, “Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, 1955-1990,” May 2001, “Party Leaders,” “Warsaw Pact Records,” PHP. As Mastny notes, Moscow did not “publicize its problems with the Romanians” despite their essential nature, and avoided forcing the contentious adoption of “documents against their opposition.”
51. Locher (2002), p. 18, PHP.
52. See e.g. *Report for the Czechoslovak Party Presidium on the PCC Meeting*, 27 May 1980, p. 8, “XVII. Warsaw, 14-15 May 1980,” and *Romanian Proposal for Warsaw Pact Reform: Information regarding the Romanian Proposal*, 8 July 1988, p. 3, “XXII. Meeting of the PCC, Warsaw, 15-16 July 1988,” in Mastny, Nuenlist, Locher, and Selvage (2001), PHP
53. Agents working in the residence “had to take more subtle and more numerous measures of precaution” because exposure “would have especially negative effects.” Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 103.
54. See Herbstritt (2004) for the first analysis of these documents.
55. Bucharest provoked Andropov’s fury (again) by denying a US first nuclear strike intention (RYAN), rejecting a military build-up, refusing to label the US responsible for global tensions, and insisting on drastic unilateral military and budget reductions. Throughout Andropov’s “term as general secretary, RYAN remained the FCD’s first priority.” Andrew and Mitrokhin (2001), pp. 213-4; Vojtech Mastny, “Editorial Note: XVIII. Meeting of the PCC, Prague, 4-5 January 1983,” “Records of the Warsaw Pact Committee: Records of the Political Consultative Council [PCC],” PHP.
56. David Childs and Richard Poplewell, *The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service*, New York, New York University Press, 1996, p. 177. Werner Irmeler was head of ZAIG during 1965-1989.
57. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7120, pp. 282-3; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 354.
58. US military assistance to Yugoslavia initiated in 1952 provided \$750 million of aid by 1958, and “several hundred” Yugoslavs “received advanced training in U.S. military schools” while the army was “modernized with Western armaments during a period when Yugoslavia felt an active threat of military intervention.” It was henceforth presumed that Yugoslavia would be provided with further military assistance if attacked. CIA, *The Yugoslav Military Elite (U)*, R-2131, February 1977, RAND publication prepared for Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 February 1977 (declassified 22 June 2004), pp. 8, 28, CIA. Yugoslavia also signed assistance agreements with NATO members Greece and Turkey.
59. Neil Barnett, *Tito*, London, Haus Publishing, 2006, p. 138; *The Yugoslav Military Elite (U)* (1977), p. 48.
60. Steven Zaloga and James Loop, *Soviet Bloc Elite Forces*, London, Osprey,

1985, p. 18. The 103rd was already famous for its role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. “In 1979 the 105th Air Assault Division, supported by elements of the 103rd,” was deployed in the invasion of Afghanistan. Op. cit., p. 12. Units of the 102nd Air Assault Division were permanently based in Chişinău and Tiraspol in the Moldavian SSR.

61. *Memorandum of Conversation*, Washington, 18 May 1964, Document no. 12, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Volume XVII, *Eastern Europe*, Washington D.C., 1996.

62. For ‘leaks’ on Romanian mediation in Vietnam see *The New York Times*, 22 and 23 November 1965.

63. Childs and Popplewell (1990), pp. 114 and 229.

64. See Herbstritt (2004); Herbstritt and Olaru (2005).

65. The East German INTERKIT reports are available at INTERKIT, PHP. See also the Bulgarian intelligence materials at PHP and at CWHIP. KGB reports are available in the volumes co-authored by former KGB officers Oleg Kalugin, Oleg Gordievsky, and Vasili Mitrokhin cited below, as well as works authored individually by Kalugin and Mitrokhin.

66. Brucan admitted conspiring with Soviet authorities during the 1970s and 1980s. Silviu Brucan, *Generație irosită* [Wasted Generation], Bucharest, Universal & Calistrat Hogaş, 1992, p. 188. Brucan and Prime Minister Petre Roman fought tenaciously for the appointment of Caraman, who remained subordinate to Prime Minister Roman from January 1990 until the passage of the National Security Law in July 1991. After his ouster in April 1992 Caraman became Roman’s security advisor. “Armageddonul spionilor: ‘Reteaua Caraman’” [The Spy Armageddon: The Caraman Network], *Ziua*, 7 February 2005. The knock-on affect of Militaru’s confirmation was tremendous as he in turn re-activated 30 senior, mostly Soviet trained, officers and transferred others such that by January 1990 GRU agents exposed in the 1970s had been appointed to head the interior ministry, military intelligence, and the general staff. Caraman brought in as his deputies former *Securitate* deputies responsible for anti-western operations, most notably Constantin Silinescu, who attempted to scuttle NATO integration negotiations in 1996-1997, and Ristea Priboi, who partnered with convicted terrorist Omar Hayssam. “Un grup, cu o clară dependență estică, a încercat împiedicarea integrării României în NATO” [A Group with a Clear Eastern Dependence Tried to Block Romania’s Integration in NATO], interview with Senator Ioan Talpeş, former coordinator of the Romanian intelligence community, *Independent*, 18 January 2008, pp. 6-7, www.independent-al.ro; O. C. Hoge, “Generalul Silinescu, fost spion, consilier special al primului-ministru” [General Silinescu, former Spy, Special Counselor to the Prime Minister], *Evenimentul Zilei*, 19 January 2001; L. P., “Nastase: ‘L-am apărat și îl mai apăr pe Priboi’” [Nastase: “I Have Defended and I Will Continue to Defend Priboi”], *Evenimentul Zilei*, 20 November 2002.

67. Vadim Zagladin, *Note Regarding Discussions with Silviu Brucan (Romania)*, 17-22 September 1990, October 1990, Gorbachev Foundation (*Mezhdunarodnii Obshestvennii fond sotsialno-ekonomicheskikh i politologicheskikh isledovaniï*: Social International Foundation for the Political and Socio-Economic Studies), Moscow, fond 3, opis, 1, dosar 7287, f. 1-8 as cited in Alex Mihai Stoenescu, “Adevărata apartenență a lui Silviu Brucan” [The True Agency of Silviu Brucan], *Vitralii: Lumini și Umbre* [Stained Glass Windows: Lights and Shadows] (Bucharest), no. 2 (March 2010), p. 89. The author wishes to thank Professor Stoenescu for providing him with the original resume of Zagladin’s eight page KGB document. Brucan likewise insisted that cooperating with the Americans (specifically against Iraq after it invaded Kuwait) compromised Soviet interests, and that “the law and morality should not be transformed into a fetish.” Stoenescu (2010), p. 90. In the 1980s Zagladin viewed “negotiation or meaningful cooperation with the capitalist world” as “not only futile but dangerous because they could nurture reformist

illusions.” See e.g., Gordon H. Hahn, *Russia’s Revolution From Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime*, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction, 2002, pp. 284-285; Walter C. Clemens, *Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence*, New York, Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. 132. Brucean was the ‘godfather’ of the Group for Social Dialogue (GDS), the civil rights group that operated as gatekeeper for determining who were appropriate interlocutors and partners for the West. By February 1990 the US intelligence community was already citing that group as legitimate authority (the “watchdog”) on Romanian democratization. See e.g. *Outlook For Eastern Europe In 1990: An Inter-Agency Intelligence Memorandum* (NI IIM 90-10001), 8 February 1990 (declassified 13 December 1999), p. 28. Several of the GDS’s founding members were exposed as collaborators of the Securitate and Soviet intelligence, and several others were complicit in attempting to conceal the security links of their GDS colleagues. See e.g. Deletant (1995), pp. 279-280; www.civimedia.ro. For a description of the disappointing results of US aid to the GDS see Thomas Carothers, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1996. The GDS and its members remained the principal beneficiaries of Western civic society support as of this writing.

68. Larry L. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Eastern Europe’s Emerging Democracies,” *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 48, no. 1 (April 2004), pp. 21-22; Jane Perlez, “Touchy Issue of Bigger NATO: Spy Agencies,” *New York Times*, 5 January 1998.

69. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., *Security Intelligence Services In New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia And Romania*, New York, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 64-65, 111; Oldrich Czerny, *Czechoslovak (Czech) Intelligence After the Cold War*, Working Paper no. , Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2002, pp. 4-5; Tomas Horejsi, “Minister Tvrdik to Replace Army Intelligence Chief,” *Lidove Noviny*, 8 April 2003, <http://www.fas.or/irp/world/czech/armyint.html>.

70. Watts (2004), p. 18. The continuity of Bulgarian services and their ties with Soviet/Russian services have been described as the most extensive, although the 2007 Macierewicz report on Poland and the 2008 revelations regarding Hungarian intelligence discussed below indicate very similar continuities. Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, editors, *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 421; and Nikolai Bozhilov, “Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience of the Last Decade,” paper prepared for workshop on Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services,” Geneva Centre for Democratic of Armed Forces, 3-5 October 2002, www.dcaf.ch.

71. *Report on the actions of soldiers and employees of the former Military Intelligence Services (WSI) performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence activity and other actions going beyond the issues of State defense and safety of the Polish Army*, President of the Verification Commission Antoni Macierewicz, coordinator, Warsaw, 16 February 2007, pp. 28-64. Soviet-trained officers included WSI chiefs Marek Dukaczewski (2001-2006); Kazimierz Głowacki (1996-1997); and Bolesław Izydorczyk (1992-1994).

72. The Macierewicz report conservatively estimated that “at least” 800 senior Polish officers underwent GRU or KGB training from the early 1970s to 1989. Given that 127 attended such institutions during 1973-1974 alone, the number may have been several times higher.

73. Judy Dempsey, “K.G.B.-Trained Hungarian Has NATO Role,” *New York Times*, 4 February 2008. The NBH boss, Sándor Laborc, had taken over from another KGB alumnus, Lajos Galambos. As Jane Perlez noted a decade earlier, even though a center-right government took over “after the fall of the Communists, there was little purging of the secret services” and, as of 1998, both Hungarian civilian and military

intelligence were “headed by officials from the Communist era.” Perlez (1998).

74. KBH chief Géza Stefan was also a graduate of the KGB’s Dzerzhinsky Academy. “Debate over the Hungarian secret services II,” *Budapest Analyses*, no. 177, 8 December 2007 and “The crisis of the Hungarian intelligence services,” *Budapest Analyses*, no. 160, 10 July 2007, www.budapestanalyses.hu. The officers in charge of classifying materials at KBH and IH, Miklós Herczeg and László Hellebrand, were also Soviet trained. “No end to dirty tricks in Hungary’s secret services,” *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, 08.05.2007.

75. Zielonka and Pravda (2001), p. 421.

76. As former chief of the US National Security Agency, General William Odom, noted in 1998, “the Russians will probably have enough residual capacity [in Hungary and Poland] to cause us serious problems.” Jane Perlez, “Touch Issue Of Bigger NATO: Spy Agencies,” *New York Times*, 5 January 1998.

77. Incidental information on Romania emerged from Soviet era archives relating to interwar operations against Poland, but files on KGB and GRU operations against Romania remain closed. Soviet operations were described by the Romanian security intelligence chief during the 1920s, by Western observers, and by former Soviet agents. See e.g. Zaharia Huzărescu, *Mișcarea subversivă în Basarabia* [The Subversive Movement in Bessarabia], Kishineff, State Printing Office, 1925; Charles Upson Clark, *Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Dniester River*, New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1927; and the Romanian references in Dallin (1955). Hungarian intelligence organizations and operations are discussed by Romanian intelligence officers in Ioan Dumitru, *Spionajul maghiar în România 1918-1940: Însemnări documentare* [Hungarian Espionage in Romania 1918-1940: Documentary Notes], Bucharest, Editura Concordia, no date; Marian Ureche, *Serviciile secrete maghiare* [Hungarian Secret Services], Bucharest, I.S.I., 1992; Liviu Gaitan, *Serviciul de spionaj horthyst* [Horthy’s Espionage Service], Bran, 1993; Nevian Tunareanu, *Organizarea și activitatea desfășurată de serviciile de informații maghiare împotriva României în perioada interbelică* [The Organization and Activity of Hungarian Intelligence Services Against Romania in the Interwar Period], Bucharest, 1995; Constantin Aioanei and Nevian Tunareanu, *Acțiuni ale spionajului ungar împotriva României în perioada 1940-1950* [Hungarian Espionage Operations Against Romania During 1940-1950], Bucharest 1996; and Traian-Valentin Poncea and Aurel Rogojean, *Spionajul ungar în România* [Hungarian Espionage in Romania], Bucharest, Editura Elion, 2007. For Hungarian Communist-era security structures see János Kenedi, *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv* [A Concise State Security Reader], Budapest, Magvető, 1996; László Varga, “Watchers and the Watched,” *The Hungarian Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 146 (summer 1997), pp. 51-77; and Raija Oikari, “On the Border of Propaganda and What Can Be Said” in Ansii Halmesvirta, editor, *Bridge Building and Political Cultures: Hungary and Finland 1956-1989*, *Hungarologische Beiträge*, vol. 18, Jyväskylä, Finland, University of Jyväskylä, 2006, pp. 299-356.

78. *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), 11 June 1999.

79. Interview by *Vlast* correspondent Marina Kalashnikova with former Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Ivan Aboimov, “The Country’s Leadership Regarded the GDR as Self-supporting Unit,” *Kommersant*, 26 April 2005. The continuity of Russo-Hungarian relations with its Soviet-Hungarian predecessor was made very explicit. According to Aboimov, Hungarian authorities first met with the out-going Gorbachev and then, immediately afterward in the same meeting room, with the in-coming Yeltsin.

80. For Hungarian elite and media depiction of the agreement as a major achievement, see Jorg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary: 1867-1994*, New York, Longman, 1996, p. 334. For later characterization of the agreement as forced upon Budapest and an embarrassment, see Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace: Russia’s New*

Imperialism, Westport, CT, Praeger, 2004, p. 152. According to one author, Hungary was able to “bring pressure to bear on Rumania [sic] by co-operating with the powerful neighboring countries with which it lives in discord,” and “both Russia and the Ukraine are Hungary’s allies, when it comes to matters concerning Rumania.” László Maracz, *Hungarian Revival: Political Reflections on Central Europe*, Nieuwegein, Aspekt, 1996, p. 384.

81. The 1990-1994 Hungarian Democratic Forum government made this a centerpiece of their policy. The FIDESZ government of Victor Orban revived it during 1998-2002, with Orban declaring that “Budapest must openly support the aspirations for autonomy of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania as well as the adequate institutions for that autonomy,” specifying that his party’s intention “transcends the Basic Treaty” between Hungary and Romania. *Erdélyi Napló*, 12 August 1997.

82. Hoensch (1996), pp. 285, 313-314.

83. It is worth noting that European and American institutions avoided Romania more or less entirely until 1993, prolonging the effect of such charges. By the mid 1990s, however, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Minorities, Max van der Stoep, and other independent western organizations, adjudged Romania a model for approaching ethnic relations and avoiding ethnic violence.

84. Bugajski (2004), pp. 98, 103-105, 216.

85. *Ibid.* Moscow used similar techniques to “discredit” Moldovan government attempts to establish closer relations with Bucharest, condemning it “for its ‘Romanianism’” and alleging that it was attempting “to subdue the Slavic populations along the Dniestr River.” *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-6.

86. *Perestroika at the Crossroads: An Intelligence Assessment* (SOV 90-10015), 1 March 1990 (declassified 30 January 2001), pp. vi and 3, CIA.

87. “USSR: Moldavia Signs Agreement With Romania” in *National Intelligence Daily*, Tuesday, 2 October 1990 (declassified June 1999), p. 11, CIA.

88. *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE-11-18-1990), *The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Year*, 1 November 1990, p. 4, CIA.

89. At the time, yet-to-be exposed Soviet agents within the CIA such as Aldrich Ames and Harold James Nicholson – the latter then serving as CIA station chief in Bucharest – may have been in a position to provide these evaluations to the KGB directly.

90. Ceaușescu protested the sudden influx of Soviet ‘tourists’ to Moscow at the time, none of whom stayed in hotels. See e.g. Mircea Munteanu, *New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania*, e-Dossier no. 5, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2001, pp. 3-11, CWIHP. The Romanian Senate’s investigation into the events of December 1989 disclosed the extraordinary jump in Soviet ‘tourists’ from 30,000 in 1988 to 67,000 in 1989 as recorded in customs and border statistics, as well as the unexplained delay in their departure. Mention of this glaring anomaly was qualified as unwarranted “conspiracy theory.” See e.g. *Deposition of Petre Roman*, Transcript no. 90/8.03.1994, Romanian Senate Archive, Bucharest, pp. 44-45. According to ex-Prime Minister Roman, 30,000 Russians ‘tourists’ remained in Romania for almost a year, until officially requested to leave in October 1990. Allegedly, Caraman’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) informed Roman about them only at that time. However, since at least March, Romanian TV had broadcast news stories of the Russian encampments.

91. Yevgheny Primakov, “Opravdano li rasshirenie NATO? Osoboe mnenie Sluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossii” [Is NATO Expansion Justified? Special Opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia], *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 26 November 1993; Black (2000), pp. 8-9, 109-10 and 157; “Primakov Intervention” Brussels, NATO HQ (11 Dec 1996), February 13, 1998, www.nato.int; Bugajski, (2004), p. 218.

92. Yevgheny Primakov, *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millenium*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 131.

93. See e.g. Munteanu (2001), pp. 3-11, at CWIHP. Former Soviet intelligence assets continue to offer creative justification for the presence of these idiosyncratic “tourists,” who had to be formally invited to leave the country ten months after they began their ‘transit.’ For example, former *Novovsti* correspondent, Viacheslav Samoskin, in Romania at the time of the revolution, claimed that the “tourists” were part of an economic agreement with the USSR whereby Ceaușescu demanded a guaranteed 35,000 Soviet tourists a year “to buy Romanian goods,” and their visits just happened to be “concentrated at the end of the year.” Oana Balan, “Reporter rus sub gloanțe românești” [A Russian Reporter Under Romanian Bullets], *Adevărul*, 23 December 2009. *Novosti Press Agency* (APN) was well known as a front for Soviet intelligence, especially for the KGB’s Service A “active measures” personnel, which staffed an entire section. John Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, New York, Reader’s Digest Press, 1983, p. 446.

94. Russia was remarkably successful in convincing Western observers that the treaty stale-mate was due to unreasonable Romanian demand for an explicit condemnation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In fact, Bucharest and Moscow had reached agreement on an innocuous condemnation of all “pacts, diktats and invasions” already in 1993. It was Romania’s Western and NATO option that remained contentious for Moscow.

95. Bugajski (2004), p. 98.

II

Imperial Ambitions, Communist Conflicts

*Surely you don't suppose we'd fight for the Rumanians do you?*¹

- Allied Russian Commander, General Andrei Zaionchikovski, July 1916

*Such are my feelings that if His Majesty (the Tsar) ordered me to send fifteen wounded soldiers to Rumania, I would on no account send a sixteenth.*²

- Imperial Russian Chief of Staff, General Mikhail Alexiev, December 1916

*[Romania is] the Center of Counter-revolution in the South.*³

- Soviet Foreign Commissariat, November 1918

*[Preventing] Entente imperialism from forcing Hungary to hand over its territory, food, industries, and prime materials to the Romanian oligarchy, is the guiding principle of the proletarian revolution.*⁴

- Béla Kun to Lenin, March 1919

*Until the time is ripe for an attack, pacific relations should be maintained with Romania, yet every opportunity must be used to isolate it diplomatically and an active irredentist organization must continue to exist in Transylvania.*⁵

- Admiral Miklós Horthy, October 1919

*[I]ntensify Communist work among the Magyar population of those territories annexed to Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia [for] self-determination up to the secession from the states which had annexed them.*⁶

- KOMINTERN 5th World Congress, July 1924

*[C]onditions do not permit the immediate realization of the liberation of Bessarabia from under the foreign bourgeois-landowner yoke [while] the struggle of the USSR... is transferred onto the field of diplomatic activity.*⁷

- Bessarabian Society Congress, April 1925

*The Daco-Romanians must disappear from this territory [of Transylvania].*⁸

- Popular Budapest newspaper, April 1932

III

Stalin's Leveraging of Transylvania

*It is clear that the responsible government cannot employ all means necessary to attain the goal for political reasons. ...activity against the Romanians in northern Transylvania can only be executed by non-official Hungarian patriots [with] the secret support of the responsible Hungarian government... [Those engaged] in actions against the Romanians must be entirely assured of immunity from punishment.*¹

- Plan Adopted by Hungarian Government, December 1941

*The solution remains separating Transylvania...either provisionally, until we reach an accord with Hungary or Romania, or long-term, bearing in mind that this small state will need a protector, which could only be the Soviet Union. ...Romania's dependence on us will be even greater if Transylvania remains a self-standing state and its future passing to Romania will depend on us*²

- Soviet "Litvinov" Commission, June 1944

*That still does not mean that Transylvania is given definitively to Romania.*³

- Joseph Stalin, March 1945

*First of all, Hungary presented her territorial claims to Romania. We know that Romania contributed to Hitler's victory by fighting, whereas we contributed to it only by working. ...[T]he satisfaction of the modest and real minimal Hungarian territorial claims would best serve the interest of Romanian democracy, too.*⁴

- Mátyás Rákosi, August 1945

*The common ideal can only be realized through a well directed propaganda... Our trustworthy elements should infiltrate the Romanian Communist Party through any possible path, where they should act intensively and in a disciplined manner, winning trust in order to obtain important posts especially in the state administration. Our misguided brothers who currently collaborate with the Romanian democratic parties should also be convinced that through their votes to give concourse to our cause.*⁵

- Hungarian Government Instruction, September 1946

*Without Transylvania there is no Hungary, because Transylvania was always the true Hungary.*⁶

- Hungarian poet Ady Endre, 1954

*[P]art of Transylvania must be returned to Hungary.*⁷

- Mátyás Rákosi, September 1954

IV

Slipping Moscow's Leash Under Khrushchev

*Give autonomy to Transylvania.*¹

- János Kádár, October 1956

*[T]he Romanian Government does not consider the stationing of Soviet troops on its territory to be necessary... At the same time, the Government of the Soviet Union [should consider] the problem of recalling Soviet advisors working for various institutions of the Romanian People's Republic...*²

- Romanian Politburo Instruction, October 1956

*The appellation 'Soviet advisors' does not correspond to the role they play and might inadvertently convey the mistaken idea that these advisors are meddling in Romanian internal affairs.*³

- Nikita Khrushchev, January 1957

In Romania, and even in the ranks of its Communist Party, pernicious nationalist and anti-Soviet attitudes were developing which must be cut off the root. ...The Mamalizhniki are not a nation, but a whore.*⁴

- Nikita Khrushchev, September 1960

*Maintaining intelligence networks in the interior of the Party, in a Socialist state, is something you do only when you consider that you are in a position of supremacy [and] the other a subordinate...it is not only a transgression of sovereignty, but indicative of something more difficult to qualify, the relationship of master and slave. ...We raised the question of their not having agent networks in any Socialist country which, on top of everything else, made Khrushchev call us "bastards."*⁵

- Gheorghiu Dej, August 1963

*Romanian attempts to become independent from COMECON [CMEA] economically could be tolerated, but if they are so blind as to try and leave the Warsaw Pact then our soldiers...will have the last word ...The entire situation of the Balkans would become uncontrollable if Romania would follow Yugoslavia and Albania into the anti-Soviet camp.*⁶

- Nikita Khrushchev, August 1964

*Transylvania has always been Hungarian...the Magyar language and Hungarian culture predominate there.*⁷

- Nikita Khrushchev, 1964

V

From Bucharest Spring to Prague Spring

[An] international center is no longer adequate. ...No party is allowed to go over the heads of the party leaders of one country or another, and even less to launch appeals for the removal or change of the leadership of a party.¹

- RCP 'Declaration of Independence, April 1964

[I]f Rumania had its way it would not belong to any pact including Warsaw Pact and would be concerned only with defense its own frontiers. ...Rumania maintains its military alliances with reluctance and their only concern is defense of their own country.²

- Romanian Army officers, November 1964

[W]ithin the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Unified Command, the armies of the other socialist countries of Europe are subordinated [to Moscow]. We intend to do away with this state of affairs.³

- Ceaușescu to Deng Xiaoping, July 1965

[Romania seeks] to paralyze the alliance and transform its organs into noncommittal discussion clubs.⁴

- Polish Foreign Ministry, February 1966

Ceaușescu has been vigorously delivering speeches saying that Romanians, together with all countries of the socialist camp, will fight against imperialist aggression. Of course, that is merely a façade. Everything indicates that they intend to finally break relations with our camp. One cannot exclude their...withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.⁵

- Leonid Brezhnev, July 1967

What is the line followed by the Romanian leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet! In whose favor is such a political line? Who permits the heads of the Romanian leadership to play with the fate of the Romanian working class, with the interests of our system, which has been struggling for so many years? Who has permitted them that, who has given them such right?!⁶

- Todor Zhivkov, March 1968

[The Romanians] welcome the events happening in Czechoslovakia, since they suppose that they might find allies against the Soviet Union, against CMEA, and against the Warsaw Pact there.⁷

- János Kádár, June 1968

VI

1968: 'Tourists,' Friends & Dissappointments

[W]e are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too.¹

- Todor Zhivkov, March 1968

[Romania] must toe the line or take the consequences.²

- General Wojciech Jaruzelski, August 1968

Twice in your lifetime and mine world war has come upon us, triggered by events in Eastern Europe. ...I would hope that your government would hold its hand, if it is the case that a military movement is contemplated against Rumania or any other country in Eastern Europe.³

- Lyndon B. Johnson to Alexei Kosygin, August 1968

[Over 100] Soviet officers dressed in civilian clothes arrived under cover as tourists on [to take over the airport.]... Approximately ten days beforehand, Soviet officers dressed in civilian clothing were sent into Czechoslovakia as 'tourists' to undertake the reconnaissance of important military objectives. During the night of 20-21 August, they changed their civilian clothes for military uniforms and carried out their mission.⁴

- Romanian Intelligence Report, September 1968

Orders were prepared last week for invasion of Romania by Soviet, Polish and Hungarian troops on 22 November at 0400 hours...orders referred to an invasion and not to an exercise.⁵

- Dutch Military Intelligence, November 1968

[W]e cannot exclude the possibility that the Russians are making preparations for very early military action against Romania. ...We think it right to ensure that the Romanians are aware of our assessment. This should be done at the highest level possible, and in strict confidence.⁶

- British Foreign Minister Stewart, November 1968

At the time they had great plans, not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against you and Yugoslavia. If you are prepared, they will fear you. ... We are helping those who fight against invasion.⁷

- Mao Zedong to Nicolae Ceaușescu, June 1971

VII

Targeting Romania After the Invasion

[Moscow will use joint exercises] to attempt to achieve, as it did in Czechoslovakia, the permanent stationing of Soviet troops and also the replacement of several high officials of the party and state who in one way or another oppose the Soviet line. ...[T]he contingency plan of the Soviet leadership provided for instigation of diversions among population and the establishment of pro-Soviet factions to oppose the measures taken by the Romanian government, both domestically and in foreign policy.¹

- West German Military Intelligence, January 1969

Romania refuses to participate to the common military measures of the Warsaw Pact and requests the restructuring of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces, which would mean in fact a disintegration of the armed forces and an objective weakening of their firepower.²

- Stasi Report, February 1969

Of course, we are by no means trying to cause a conflict. We are trying to find some common ground with the Soviet Union...based on a set of principles. If the Soviet Union tries to do in Romania what it did in Czechoslovakia we will fight back. Of course, we don't have the pretension to crush the Soviet army, to reach Moscow and dictate peace to the Kremlin... We cannot do this, but we will fight in Romania the same way the Vietnamese are.³

- Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Zhou Enlai, September 1969

[W]here did Chou En-lai get the idea that there was some threat to Romania, when [we] who are Romania's neighbors know of no such thing? ...Maybe Romania does not desire to participate in the Warsaw Pact?⁴

- Leonid Brezhnev, May 1970

The Romanian comrades still criticize the actions of the socialist countries [in invading Czechoslovakia] even during other parties' congresses, and even though so much time has passed. Of course, this only complicates the relationship among our people.⁵

- Leonid Brezhnev, June 1971

[Ceaușescu's Beijing trip] was directed against the unity and solidarity of the Warsaw Treaty states and the cohesion of the International Communist and Workers' Movement. ... It is not to be excluded that the Socialist Romanian Republic assumed a "mediating" role in the relations between China and the US, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany during this visit.⁶

- East German Intelligence, June 1971

VIII

Clandestine War Engaged

*Ceașescu has gone too far. He leads the fight against us [and] he is the fundamental obstruction to our line. ...We have had patience regarding Romanian behavior. We must try to exert influence on developments inside the country.*¹

- Leonid Brezhnev, August 1971

*Ceașescu has always forsaken us at critical moments. He rebelled against our coordinated policy towards West Germany... He abandoned us in the fight against counter-revolution in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Now he has betrayed us by his visit to China. ... It is all directed against the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and against CMEA.*²

- János Kádár, August 1971

*I cannot believe that we can exercise no influence over the Aktiv of the Romanian Party. ...We must even now identify those people in Romania on whom we can rely in the future.*³

- Edward Gierek, August 1971

*Ceașescu departs completely from our agreed line. He denies the escalation of the ideological struggle. He says the imperialists are not waging a campaign of ideological subversion. ...In my view one has to orient oneself to people who in the future will support us.*⁴

- Gustáv Husák, August 1971

*Ceașescu is a traitor [who doesn't] give a damn...about socialism or about friendship with the Soviet Union. We in the security organs are beginning to realize that he will have to be deposed.*⁵

- DSS double agent to KGB officer, spring 1972

*Romania sees in China's UN presence a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the United Nations and the possibility for its own nationalistic interpretations and activities, which deviate from those of the other socialist states. ...The Romanian-China relationship harms the agreed approach of the socialist countries on the main international issues and harms the development of unity and cohesion of the socialist world system.*⁶

- East German Intelligence, December 1972

*[It] is clearly impossible for things to go on with Romania any longer. Thus, some measure must be undertaken to eliminate this situation...the Soviet Army is prepared and the operation could be realized much sooner than in the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.*⁷

- Marshal A. Grechko, November 1973

IX

Enemy Within The Gates

[Romania is] betraying Warsaw Pact secrets to China.¹

- Oleg Rakhmanin, CPSU Liaison Department, March 1974

[Romania should] desist from steps in the future that are not in line with our common positions regarding important questions. It is no secret that the proposals of the Romanian Socialist Republic...are in tune with the intentions of the NATO countries.²

- Mátyás Szűrös, Hungarian International Department, April 1974

[Romania proposed] comprehensive international controls on the territories of socialist states through the establishment of stationary and mobile international control posts [with] the clear goal of limiting and placing under control the activities of [our] armed forces...in direct contradiction to the agreed policy.³

- Erich Honecker, April 1974

Romania's deviance from common positions of the Socialist states on questions of European security and the reduction of armed forces and weapons closely approaches the efforts of China to weaken the influence of the Soviet Union.⁴

- East German Intelligence, May 1974

[I'm not] talking about US troop withdrawals but about real reductions which should be balanced and under adequate control. ...As a matter of fact, the Chinese have done more than anyone to bring about troops reductions in Europe by obliging the Soviets to move substantial troops [44 Divisions] to the Chinese border.⁵

- Nicolae Ceaușescu to President Gerald Ford, August 1975

Whenever someone [in Latin America] disagrees with our China policy, the Romanians start brainwashing them trying to instigate conflicts; they take up rousing distrust toward the Soviet Union and breaking up the movement.⁶

- Fidel Castro to Todor Zhivkov, March 1976

With great passion the Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov along with the other defense ministers tried...to convince the Romanian comrades to abandon their standpoint which reflected nationalistic and acute sovereignty mentality. It was plain that the Romanians were out to undermine the decisions of the committee meeting of November 1976 on the clear instructions of their Party and State leadership.⁷

- Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, December 1976

Beijing and Washington [seek] rapprochement on an anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis [and] take advantage of the nationalistic deviations of Ceaușescu. It is difficult to say something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows what else he might possibly do.⁸

- Leonid Brezhnev to Erich Honecker, July 1978

Romanian officials [are] leaking information to the West.⁹

- Marshal Viktor Kulikov, October 1978